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MAKING IT "OFFICIAL": A CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS OF OKLAHOMA'S OFFICIAL ENGLISH
AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION
The Great Seal of the State of Oklahoma represents the height of Oklahoma state
action, used to authenticate official acts of the Governor. 1 Misuse of the Seal by any
party other than the State or its political subdivisions can result in a misdemeanor charge
for the offender in some situations. 2 That being said, in light of the passage of State
Question No. 751 during the November 2010 elections,3 the measure may prohibit the
State of Oklahoma from using its own seal. The Seal includes the Latin phrase Labor
Omnia Vincit, meaning "Labor Conquers All Things."4 State Question No. 751 amended
the state's constitution to include Article XXX, a provision prescribing English as
Oklahoma's official language and mandating its use in the government's "official
actions." 5 Since the Oklahoma Constitution requires affixation of the Seal to "official
actions" of the Governor, the Seal and its Latin phraseology seem to fall within the
amendment's scope, presumably requiring the State to translate the Latin phrase into
English in order to comply with Article XXX.6
Although specific to Oklahoma, Article XXX reflects a growing national
movement toward official English, often as a result of anxiety concerning immigration.7
Consequently, Article XXX immediately garnered national attention, both positive and
negative. Apart from the amendment's political underpinnings and effects, however,
1. OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 18. The Constitution excepts the Governor's approval of laws from the seal
requirement. Id.
2. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1550.41 (2008).
3. Summary Results: General Election - November 2, 2010, OKLA. STATE ELECTION BD. (Nov. 2, 2010),
http://www.ok.gov/elections/support/1Ogen.html. The measure passed by the largest margin of any state
question on the ballot, with 75.54% of Oklahoma voters voting for the measure and 24.46% voting against. Id
4. State Seal, OKLA. SEC. OF STATE, http://www.sos.state.ok.us/general/seal.htm (last visited Nov. 24,
2009).
5. OKLA. CONST. art. XXX.
6. Id See also OKLA. CONST. art. VI, § 18.
7. See generally Why is Official English Necessary?, U.S. ENGLISH, http://www.us-english.org/view/10
(last visited Nov. 18, 2009); Why Official English?, PROENGLISH,
http://www.proenglish.org/issues/offeng/index.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2009).
8. See Letter from Loretta King, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., U.S. Dept. Just., to Hon. W.A. Drew Edmonson,
Okla. Atty. Gen., House Joint Resolution 1042 (Apr. 14, 2009). The Department of Justice's letter represents a
negative reaction to Article XXX. Id. The letter suggested that Article XXX might constitute discrimination in
violation of Title VI and result in the loss of federal funding. Id. However, the Department of Justice recently
determined that a loss of federal funding would not result from the amendment's passage. Chris Casteel, Feds
Won't Oppose English Plan, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 10, 2009, at 4A. However, other groups presented more
positive responses to the amendment. See National Experts Endorse House Official English Bill, OKLA. H.R.,
http://www2.okhouse.gov/OkhouseMedia/PrintStory.aspx?NewslD=3073 (Apr. 1, 2009). Both ProEnglish and
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Article XXX presents constitutional questions that both proponents and opponents of the
measure must confront before the amendment's legitimacy may be established. By
narrowing the application of Oklahoma's Article XXX to "official actions" of the
government, proponents of the amendment cured some of the constitutional defects of
previous official English measures. Specifically, the language will most likely prevent a
reviewing court from finding the amendment unconstitutionally overbroad. However,
Article XXX may still be open to constitutional challenge for infringement of free-
speech rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution's First Amendment.
This Comment provides a preliminary constitutional analysis of Article XXX. The
histories of previous official English measures in Oklahoma, as well as judicial analysis
of similar measures in other jurisdictions, inform the examination of each possible
constitutional challenge. Part II examines Oklahoma's first attempt to pass official
English legislation via voter initiative as well as a discussion of Article XXX's language
as passed by Oklahoma voters. Part II also discusses the treatment of similar measures in
other jurisdictions. Part III considers Article XXX in light of the closely related
overbreadth and vagueness doctrines. Part IV seeks to characterize Article XXX as a
content-neutral or content-based regulation, arguing in favor of classifying the measure
as a content-based restriction. Part V analyzes Article XXX pursuant to both the strict
scrutiny required for content-based restrictions as well as the intermediate scrutiny
applied to content-neutral regulations.
STATE LAWMAKERS ACROSS THE NATION DECIDE TO MAKE IT (ENGLISH) OFFICIAL
The Official English Movement's Contemporary Beginnings in Oklahoma
Although Oklahoma passed and subsequently repealed an official English measure
in the early twentieth century,9 the contemporary Oklahoma official English movement
did not begin until 2000 with the circulation of Initiative Petition No. 366 ("Petition No.
366").'o Petition No. 366 sought to enact a statute through a ballot initiative declaring
English the official language of the State of Oklahoma and its government "[i]n order to
''encourage every citizen of [the] state to become more proficient in the English
language, thereby facilitating participation in the economic, political, and cultural
activities of [the] state ...... lIAs the language of the government, the petition required
that "[a]ll official documents, transactions, proceedings, meetings, or publications issued,
which [were] conducted or regulated by, on behalf of, or representing the state and all of
its political subdivisions" be in English.12 The petition provided for exceptions as
required by the United States and Oklahoma Constitutions, as well as federal laws and
English First, national political organizations that promote official English measures across the country,
endorsed House Joint Resolution 1042, calling it a "carefully crafted measure." Id
9. See Edda Bilger, The Oklahoma Vorwdts: The Voice of German-Americans in Oklahoma During
World War 1, 54 CHRON. OKLA. 245, 255 (1976). In the wake of World War I and as a reaction to the anti-
German sentiment prevalent at the time, the Oklahoma Legislature enacted a statute designating English as the
official language of Oklahoma and making it a criminal offense for schools to teach any other language before
the eighth grade. Id The Oklahoma Legislature rescinded the statute in 1949. Id.
10. In re Initiative Petition No. 366,46 P.3d 123 (Okla. 2002).








Pursuant to precedential authority, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reviewed the
petition prior to its placement on the ballot for approval by Oklahoma voters.14 The court
concluded that Petition No. 366 unconstitutionally infringed the right to free speech, the
right to petition the government, and the legislature's policy-making function in
contravention of the Oklahoma Constitution. 15  Petition No. 366 also proved
unconstitutionally vague.16 Although the court found the statute unconstitutionally vague
against the Oklahoma Constitution, the court applied United States Supreme Court
precedent in its reasoning.' 7 Citing Grayned v. City of Rockford,18 the court reasoned
that the measure would deter citizens from engaging in constitutionally protected
conduct. 19 Thus, the court declared Petition No. 366 "legally insufficient for submission
to a vote of the people of Oklahoma."20 However, the decision did not touch on the
propriety of official English laws or require the government to provide services in
languages other than English.2 1
The Official English Movement Across the United States
While Oklahoma lawmakers regrouped, the official English movement continued
in various forms across the nation. 22 By the year 2009, thirty states instituted official
English measures,23 either by legislative enactment or by ballot initiative.24 These
13. Id.
14. Id. at 125. See also In re Initiative Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 838 P.2d 1, 8 (Okla. 1992)
("[A] determination on a constitutional question as to the legality of a measure proposed to be enacted into law
by the people will be reached by this Court when raised by a party if, in the Court's opinion, reaching the issue
may prevent the holding of a costly and unnecessary election.").
15. In re Initiative Petition No. 366, 46 P.3d at 129. In so ruling, the court noted "that the Oklahoma
Constitution "is more protective of free speech than is the United States Constitution." Id. at 126. The court
reasoned that the statute would "prohibit all governmental communications, both written and oral, by
government employees, elected officials, and citizens, of all words, even those which are of common usage, in
any language other than English when conducting state business." Id. at 127. It is unclear to what extent the
Oklahoma Constitution proves more protective of free speech than the United States Constitution. For the
Oklahoma Supreme Court's most extended discussion of the issue, see Gaylord Entm't Co. v. Thompson, 958
P.2d 128 (Okla. 1998).
16. In re Initiative Petition No. 366, 46 P.3d at 128.
17. Id.
18. Id. (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)).
19. In re Initiative Petition No. 366,46 P.3d at 128.
20. Id. at 129.
21. Id
22. See ARiz. CONST. art. XXVIII; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-121 (2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 1.18 (West
2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 73-2801-2807 (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-1-201 (West 2008) (formerly
cited UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-13-1.5), passed in the interim. See also Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v.
Kritz, 170 P.3d 183 (Alaska 2007), decided in the interim.
23. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.01 (alternatively cited ALA. CONST. amend. 509); ALASKA STAT. §§
44.12.300-390 (West 1998); ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII; ARK. CODE ANN. § 1-4-117 (West 1987); CAL.
CONsT. art. III, § 6; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30a; FLA. CONST. art. II, § 9; GA. CODE ANN. § 50-3-100 (West
1996); HAW. CONST. art. XV, § 4 (also designating Hawai'ian as the official language, but only for public acts
and transactions as provided by law); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-121; 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 460/20 (West
1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 1-2-10-1 (West 1984) (As of 2009, a proposed constitutional amendment with more
specific provisions than required by the statute faced voter approval in 2010.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 1.18; KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 73-2801-2807; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2.013 (West 1984); MISS. CODE ANN. § 3-3-31 (West
1987); MO. CONST. art. I, § 34; MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-1-510 (1995); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 27; N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 3-C:1-C:4 (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 145-12 ( West 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-02-13
4792011
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measures generally fell into three categories, each category representing an increasing
degree of restrictiveness: symbolic, intermediary, and obligatory.25 Symbolic official
English measures, primarily implemented during the 1970s and 1980s, declared English
the official language in much the same way that a particular bird species would be
designated as the state bird and had little, if any, legal effect. 26 Intermediary measures
moved beyond the symbolic, imposing more requirements on the state, but providing for
numerous exceptions. 27 Obligatory measures, the most restrictive, required that English
be the language used in official government actions and documents. 28 Few states
successfully passed obligatory official English measures.29 Those that have provide
instruction for interpreting Oklahoma's current official English measure. 30
Prior to Oklahoma's Petition No. 366, Arizona amended its state constitution via
ballot initiative, adding an official English provision in November 1988.31 The
amendment became Article XXVIII of the state constitution after a majority of Arizona
voters cast their ballots in favor of the measure.32 Article XXVIII stated that "[t]he
English language is the official language of the State of Arizona" and, as the official
language, "the English language is the language of the ballot, the public schools and all
government functions and actions." 33 The provision provided that, with limited
exceptions, "[t]his State and all political subdivisions of this State shall act in English
and no other language." 34 The enumerated exceptions, which permitted a political
subdivision to act in a language other than English, included compliance with federal
laws, protection of public health or safety, and safeguarding the rights of criminal
defendants. 35
(1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1-696 (1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs §§ 1-27-20-1-27-26 (1995); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 4-1-404 (West 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-1-201 (West 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 1-511 (West
2005) (formerly cited VA. CODE ANN. § 7.1-42); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 8-6-101 (West 1977).
24. Why Official English?, supra note 7.
25. Josh Hill, Devin Ross & Brad Serafine, Comment, Watch Your Language! The Kansas Law Review
Survey of Official-English and English-Only Laws and Policies, 57 U. KAN. L. REv. 669, 673-74 (2009).
26. Id. at 674.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 673.
29. Id. at 674. The recent failure of several states' attempts to strengthen the existing official English
measures and provide for more stringent enforcement reinforce the difficulty of passing obligatory English
measures. See generally H.R. 3771, 118th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 2009); H.R. 55, 2009 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va.
2007).
30. See Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc.,, 170 P.3d at 188; Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 987 (Ariz.
1998).
31. Hull, 957 P.2d at 987. The amendment passed by a slim one percent margin, with 50.5% of voters
casting their ballots for the measure. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1003.
34. Id. at 1004. Article XXVHI included a broad definition of "political subdivision" for purposes of the
amendment. Id Section 1(3)(b) provided that "the phrase, 'This State and all political subdivisions of this
State' shall include every entity, person, action, or item described in this Section, as appropriate to the
circumstances." Id. at 1003. Entities provided for in Section I were:
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government;all political subdivisions,
departments, agencies, organizations, and instrumentalities of this State, including local
governments and municipalities[;]all statutes, ordinances, rules, orders, programs, and policies[;
and]all government officials and employees during the performance of government business.
Id.
35. Id. at 1004.
480 Vol. 46:477
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Article XXVIII faced its first challenge in federal court.36 Two days after its
passage,37 Maria-Kelley F. Yniguez, an employee of the Arizona Department of
Administration, filed suit against the State of Arizona in the Federal District Court of
Arizona. 38 Yniguez claimed that the amendment violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution by imposing negative sanctions on her
decision to speak Spanish at work, leading her to cease speaking Spanish on the job.39
The district court found Article XXVIII facially overbroad in violation of the First
Amendment, 4 0 a decision subsequently appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.41
The Ninth Circuit first considered the proper construction of Article XXVIII. 42
The court rejected the Arizona Attorney General's offered narrowing construction, which
limited the article's application to "official acts" of the State.4 3 The court reasoned that
the limiting construction was "completely at odds with Article XXVIII's plain
language" 44 and the amendment's enumeration of narrow exceptions to the English
language requirement "belie[d] the conveniently flexible approach that the Attorney
General ha[d] adopted ... ."45 Furthermore, from the narrow interpretation followed a
conclusion that the statute meant to exclude acts that were clearly unofficial and only
meant to facilitate the day-to-day operations of the government.46 However, the statute
included several clearly unofficial acts as enumerated exceptions.47 The inclusion of
unofficial enumerated exceptions, as well as the specific enumeration of obviously
official acts, rendered portions of the amendment superfluous and ran "directly contrary
to its structure, scope, and purpose," if the narrowing interpretation was given effect.4 8
The court went on to find the amendment unconstitutionally overbroad.4 9
In so holding, the court considered the amendment's impact on the free-speech
rights of public employees through a balancing approach, evaluating the government's
justifications for the measure in light of the First Amendment interests of public
employees. 5 0 Finding that the government's goals and concerns were, at most, indirectly
36. Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309 (D. Ariz. 1990).
37. Hull, 957 P.2d at 987.
38. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. at 310-11. Yniguez's original complaint named only the State of Arizona, but
Yniguez amended her petition that same day to include Arizona state officials serving at the time, including
Rose Mofford, Governor; Robert Corbin, Attorney General; and Catherine Eden, Director of the Department of
Administration, in order to avoid dismissal pursuant to Arizona's claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id.
at 311.
39. Id.at310.
40. Id. at 316-17.
41. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1995). Following the district
court's initial ruling, Governor Mofford declined to appeal the judgment. Id. at 926. However, Arizonans for
Official English filed a successful motion to intervene and filed notice of appeal in December 1992. Id.
42. Id. at 928-31.
43. Id. at 931.
44. Id at 929.
45. Id. at 930.
46. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d at 930.
47. Id. at 929-30.
48. Id at 930.
49. Id at 947.
50. Id. at 944. The balancing approach could best be analogized to that of the majority in United States v.
Nat ' Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995). Id. However, the court noted that the result would be the
same under any other balancing approach: the State's alleged interest would not justify the infringement on the
2011 481
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related to the means implemented by the amendment, the court concluded that the
government's desire for efficiency could not outweigh the substantial infringement of the
speech rights of public employees and the Arizona public they served. 5 1 However, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment
as moot due to Yniguez's resignation from her employment with the State of Arizona. 52
Although the Supreme Court did not consider the amendment on its merits, some
postulate that, in dicta, the Court suggested it would be open to a limiting interpretation
of the amendment in order to preserve its constitutionality. 53
In vacating the Ninth Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court noted the ongoing
litigation concerning the amendment in the Arizona state court system in the form of
Ruiz v. Symington54 and encouraged the Arizona Supreme Court to definitively rule on
the amendment's proper construction in that case.55 In Ruiz v. Symington,56 ten bilingual
plaintiffs brought suit claiming that Article XXVIII violated the First, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.57 The trial court found the
amendment constitutional, which the appellate court reversed in part and affirmed in
part.58 On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court began its discussion by noting, "in our
diverse society, the importance of establishing common bonds and a common language
between citizens is clear." 59 However, the court also realized that "[t]he American
tradition of tolerance 'recognizes a critical difference between encouraging the use of
English and repressing the use of other languages.' ""60 With these considerations in
mind, the court turned to the constitutionality of the amendment. 6 1 Like the federal
courts before it,62 the Arizona Supreme Court rejected the Attorney General's
First Amendment rights of those affected. Id.
51. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d at 947. The court noted the adverse impact of Article XXVIH
was "especially egregious because it is not uniformly spread over the population, but falls almost entirely upon
Hispanics and other national origin minorities." Id.
52. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 74-80 (1997).
53. See Amy Mackin, Comment, Lost Without Translation: The Official English Movement and the First
Amendment, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 341, 350 (2008) (The Court's statement that the lower courts' decisions
that the amendment "was unconstitutional on its face was " 'all the more puzzling in view of the [limiting
construction] the initiative sponsors advanced' " expressed a willingness to consider the limiting instruction
and save the law.) (footnote omitted).
54. Ruiz v. Symington, No. I CA-CV 94-0235, 1996 WL 309512 (Ariz. Ct. App. June 11, 1996), vacated
sub nom. Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998). Although the case was styled Ruiz v. Symington at the time
of the United States Supreme Court's decision, the case was styled Ruiz v. Hull at the time of its adjudication
before the Arizona Supreme Court. Over the course of the litigation, Governor J. Fife Symington resigned and
was replaced by Governor Jane Dee Hull, who was substituted as a party pursuant to Arizona Rules of Civil
Appellate Procedure 27(c)(1); thus, the change in style. Todd S. Purdum, Arizona Governor Convicted of
Fraud and Will Step Down, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 3, 1997, at Al; ARIz. R. Cry. APP. P. 27(c)(1).
55. Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 80. The Court did so in accordance with its decision in
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 510 (1985) ("Speculation by a federal court about the
meaning of a state statute in the absence of prior state court adjudication is particularly gratuitous when ... the
state courts stand willing to address questions of state law on certification from a federal court."). Id. at 79.
56. Symington, 1996 WL 309512.
57. Hull, 957 P.2d at 988-89. The ten plaintiffs were four elected officials, five state employees, and one
public school teacher. Id
58. Id. at 989.
59. Id at 990.
60. Id. at 991 (quoting Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d at 923).
61. Id.
62. See generally the decisions of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Arizonans for Official English, 69
482 Vol. 46:477
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construction of the amendment - that it applied only to "official actions" of the
government.63 Such a narrow interpretation worked against the plain meaning of the
amendment's wording, conflicted with the intent of the amendment's drafters, and
resulted in an untenably ambiguous amendment.64 Although the court did not address the
plaintiffs' claims that the amendment was unconstitutionally vague, the court did note
that the Attorney General's narrowing construction, if adopted, would "undoubtedly add
weight to the plaintiffs' vagueness argument." 65
The court went on to review the broadly construed language of Article XXVIII in
light of the First Amendment.66 The court rejected the argument that the provision was a
permissible content-neutral regulation of speech, reasoning the amendment served as an
effective bar to communication, and content-neutral restrictions by definition require
alternative forms of communication. 6 7 Additionally, Article XXVIII violated the purpose
of the First Amendment - protecting the free discussion of political affairs. Article
XXVIII unconstitutionally deprived non-English speaking persons access to information
about the government, as well as violated the First Amendment rights of elected officials
to communicate with their constituents.69 The amendment also violated the right to
participate in government, which the court found constitutionally protected through the
First Amendment's right to petition the government.70 In addition to the First
Amendment problems, the court determined that the amendment violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection.71 Despite the Arizona Attorney General's
urging, the court declined to sever the amendment to preserve its constitutionality. 72
Thus, the court declared the entire amendment unconstitutional.7 3
In 2006, Arizona voters passed a second official English constitutional amendment
through ballot initiative. 74 Also dubbed Article XXVIII, the second amendment differed
in many important respects from Arizona's first official English amendment. 75 The new
F.3d at 927-30 and the Arizona District Court in Mofford, 730 F. Supp. at 313-16.
63. Hull, 957 P.2d at 992.
64. Id. In finding that a narrow construction would be against the plain meaning of the amendment, the
court specifically declined to decide whether the government could constitutionally require official acts to be
conducted in English only. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the court's reasoning in declining to adopt the
narrowing construction, see infra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
65. Hull, 957 P.2d at 994 n.7.
66. Id. at 996-1000.
67. Id. at 998.
68. Id. at 996 (quoting Landmark Comm's., Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) ("Whatever
differences may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement
that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs." (citation
omitted)).
69. Id. at 997.
70. Hull, 957 P.2d at 997. See also U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
71. Hull, 957 P.2d at 1000-02. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
72. Hull, 957 P.2d at 1002.
73. Id. In so holding, the court declined to address the plaintiffs' overbreadth argument, reasoning
overbreadth should only be addressed when its effect would be "more than salutary" and since the provision
was unconstitutional pursuant to the First and Fourteenth Amendments an overbreadth analysis would be
superfluous. Id. at 999 n. 11.
74. ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII. See also Eric Pfeffier, Arizona Makes English Official: 74 Percent OK State
Language Ballot Initiative, WASH, TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at A12. Unlike Arizona's first official English
amendment, Proposition 103 overwhelmingly passed, garnering 74% of Arizona voters' support. Id.
75. ARIz. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 5. See also Mackin, supra note 53, at 351.
4832011
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amendment included more specific exceptions and a rule of construction ensuring elected
officials the ability to communicate in languages other than English in some situations. 76
Most significantly, the second amendment provided that "[o]fficial actions shall be
conducted in English," and contained an explicit definition of official action as "the
performance of any function or action on behalf of this state or a political subdivision of
this state or required by state law that appears to present the views, position or
imprimatur of the state or political subdivision or that binds or commits the state or
political subdivision."77 Although the new amendment has not faced the same judicial
challenges as the previous amendment, it faced criticism within Arizona as being
ineffective, leaving Arizona susceptible to further legislative action.78
In 1998, while the first Arizona official English amendment proceeded through the
court system, Alaska voters approved a ballot initiative adopting an official English
statute, codified the following year as Alaska Stat. §§ 44.12.300 to .390 ("Alaska
provision").79 In addition to codifying English as the official language of the State of
Alaska, the original statutory language provided that "[t]he "English language is the
language to be used by all public agencies in all government functions and actions. The
English language shall be used in the preparation of all official public documents and
records . . . .,,0 The Alaska provision also included extensive exceptions when necessity
mandated the use of a language other than English, including exceptions for public
officials already proficient in another language and as necessary to comply with federal
law. Unlike the Arizona and first Oklahoma official English provisions, the Alaska
provision included a severability clause.82 Shortly following the initiative's passage, two
separate groups filed suits seeking injunctions against enforcement of the Alaska
provision; the cases were consolidated in 1999.83 After the trial court found the provision
violated Alaska's free-speech safeguard,84 the Alaska Supreme Court took up the
76. ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 5. See also Mackin, supra note 53, at 351.
77. ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 1.
78. See generally Editorial, Minimal Impact: Prop 103's Mandated Use of English Hasn't Prompted
Lawsuits, nor Has It Seriously Altered Government Communications, TRIB. (Mesa, Ariz.), Dec. 11, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 24455559; Ernesto Portillo, Jr., English Language Provision Is Ignored, ARIZ. DAILY
STAR, Jan. 5, 2007, at Bl,available at 2007 WLNR 1461152.
79. ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.12.300-390 (West 1998). See also Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v.
Kritz, 170 P.3d 183, 187 (Alaska 2007).
80. ALASKA STAT. § 44.12.320 (declared unconstitutional in part 2007). See also Alaskans for a Common
Language, Inc., 170 P.3d at 191.
81. ALASKA STAT. § 44.12.340. The provision also includes numerous exceptions to promote judicial
efficiency and safeguards. These exceptions are as follows:
(5) to protect the constitutional and legal rights of criminal defendants;(6) to serve the needs of the judicial
system in civil and criminal cases in compliance with court rules and orders; [and](7) to investigate criminal
activity and protect the rights of crime victims.
Id. See also Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc., 170 P.3d at 191.
82. ALASKA STAT. § 44.12.390. See also Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc., 170 P.3d at 192. A
severability clause is "[a] provision that keeps the remaining provisions of a contract or statute in force if any
portion of that contract or statute is judicially declared void, unenforceable, or unconstitutional." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1498 (9th ed. 2009).
83. Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc., 170 P.3d at 187-88. The first plaintiff group consisted
primarily of bilingual public officials. Id. at 187. The second group consisted of either bilingual residents or
citizens proficient only in native languages. Id at 187.
84. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 5.
484 Vol. 46:477
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constitutionality of the official English statute on appeal.8 5
Much like the Arizona Attorney General, Alaskans for a Common Language
argued that the statute should be narrowly construed, applying only to "official acts" of
the State.86 Although the Alaska Supreme Court rejected this argument in regard to the
first sentence of section .320 (pertaining to government actions), 87 the second section of
.320 (concerning government documents) proved susceptible to a narrow reading. The
court reasoned "[t]he text of the second sentence include[d] the word 'official,' thus
'plainly contemplat[ing]' . . . a category of informal, unofficial written documents
outside the reach of the [statute]." 89 The court construed the second sentence to mean
that multilingual official documents were not prohibited as long as the State also
published the required English-language version.90 However, since the first sentence of
section .320 required a broad construction, it infringed on constitutionally protected
speech of private citizens, government employees, and elected officials. 9 1
Analogizing the Alaska statute to Arizona's first Article XXVIII, the court found
the Alaska provision likewise "bar[red] communication itself' making the statute a
content-based, rather than content-neutral, regulation of speech rights.92 The court
reasoned that the statute "define[d] a broad category of speech - speech in languages
other than English - and simply forb[ade] it .... Such a requirement harm[ed] 'society
as a whole, which [was] deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.' ""93 As a
content-based restriction, the provision was subject to a strict-scrutiny analysis.94
Although the court found compelling state interests in the statute,9 5 it ultimately
concluded that the statute was not sufficiently tailored to achieve its ends, and, thus,
unconstitutional against both the United States and Alaska Constitutions. 96 However, the
85. Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc., 170 P.3d at 189. The court's analysis reflects the statute's
validity in light of both the United States and Alaska Constitutions. Id
86. Id at 194.
87. Id. at 195. "The English language is the language to be used by all public agencies in all government
functions and actions." Id at 191.
88. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 44.12.320 (West 1998) ("The English language shall be used in the preparation
of all official public documents and records, including all documents officially compiled, published or recorded
by the government.").
89. Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc., 170 P.3d at 196. The Court also provided a non-exhaustive list
of possible unofficial documents which would be outside of the scope of the official English statute, including:
a note from a public school teacher to a parent, a letter from a public health employee offering medical advice,
or an invoice prepared by a city mechanic. Id at 197.
90. Id.
91. Id at 197-98. The court rejected Alaskans for a Common Language's argument that the provision
regulated only government speech, finding that such an interpretation would expand the scope of the
government-as-speaker doctrine well beyond the narrow construction applied by the Supreme Court. Id. at
198-99. See generally Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (specific government program
regarding legal representation for welfare clients); Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529
U.S. 217 (2000) (specifying universities); and Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (specifying funding
grantees with narrow message).
92. Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc., 170 P.3d at 206.
93. Id. (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003)).
94. Id
95. Id. at 207. Compelling state interests noted by the court included preserving and strengthening the
English language, as well as increasing the efficiency of state government. Id.
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court found the unconstitutional first sentence severable from the constitutional second
sentence of section .320, ultimately preserving English as the language of official
documents.97
Current State of the Oklahoma Official English Movement
Nearly ten years after Petition No. 366, Oklahoma took up the official English
issue again with the introduction of State Question 751.9 In the years since Petition No.
366, Oklahoma's population changed, a phenomenon reflected in language
demographics. 99 In 2000, the year of the petition, when questioned about language
preferences, 92.6% of Oklahoma citizens identified themselves as speaking only English
in the home.100 The remaining 7.4% of the population primarily spoke a language other
than English in the home, with the majority speaking Spanish.101 The Census also
identified the percentage of non-primary English speakers who spoke English less than
very well.102 National Census data reflected a much higher percentage of people
speaking languages other than English in the home.103 In 2000, approximately 18% of
the country's total population indicated that they spoke a language other than English
within the home, with the majority speaking Spanish. 104 Interestingly, on both the
national and state level, the Asian language group possessed the highest percentage of its
speaking population that spoke English less than very well. 105
In the American Community Survey reflecting Oklahoma's 2008 population
statistics, 91.6% of Oklahoma's population indicated that they spoke English only in the
home,106 a full percentage point decrease from 2000.107 Unlike the 2000 Census data,
97. Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc., 170 P.3d at 215. In so holding, the court mandated that the
surviving statute be narrowly construed to avoid unconstitutionality. Id.
98. See text accompanying infra notes 115-20.
99. Compare Census 2000 Data for the State of Oklahoma, Profile of General Demographic
Characteristics, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTrable? bm=y&-
geoid=04000US40&-qr _name=DEC_2000_SFIUDP1&-dsname=DEC_2000SF U&-redoLog'false
(last visitedOct. 3, 2009) with American Community Survey, Oklahoma Data Profile, Selected Social
Characteristics, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ADPTable?_bm=y&-
context--adp&-qrname-ACS_2008_LYRG00_DP2&-dsname=ACS_2008lYR_000_&-treeid=308&-
redoLog-true&- caller-geoselect&-geo id=04000US40&-format-&- lang-en (last visited Oct. 3, 2009). For
a graphical representation of population changes in regards to language preferences, see appendix A and
appendix C of this Comment.
100. Census 2000 Data for the State of Oklahoma, Profile of Selected Social Characteristics, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?_bm-y&-geo id=04000US40&-
qr _name=DEC2000_SF3_UDP2&-ds_name=DEC_2000_SF3_U&-redoLog-false (last visited Oct. 3,
2009).
101. Id. See appendix A of this Comment for a breakdown of the various languages apart from English
primarily spoken in Oklahoma homes.
102. Id. See appendix A of this Comment for a graphical representation of the percentage of each language
group speaking English less than very well.
103. See generally Language Use and English-Speaking Ability: 2000, Census 2000 Br., (U.S. Dept.
Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-29.pdf.
104. Id. at 1-2. The 18% of the population indicating they spoke a language other than English in the home
represented approximately forty-seven million people. Id. at 2. For a graphical representation of language
preference in terms of specific languages spoken, see appendix B of this Comment.
105. See generally appendix A and appendix B.
106. Oklahoma Data Profile, Selected Social Characteristics, supra note 99. That is, in 2008, 118,074 more
people spoke a language other than English in the home. Id; Census 2000 Data for the State of Oklahoma,
Selected Social Characteristics, supra note 100.
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2008 demographic estimates included the percentage of Oklahoma's population that
spoke "all other languages," apart from the designated language groups of Spanish, Indo-
European, or Asian languages.lo0 Presumably, Native American languages fell into this
"other" category.109 Regardless of the inclusion of the new "other" language group, as in
2000, the majority of non-English speakers spoke Spanish.110 Although the percentage
of those speaking English less than very well increased slightly overall, percentages of
less than very well speakers decreased in each individual language group.Ill Oklahoma's
2008 demographics in many respects reflected those nationwide.112 Nationally, 80.3% of
respondents indicated that they spoke English only in the home, and the majority of non-
English speakers preferred Spanish.113 As was the case in Oklahoma, each language
group saw a decrease in the percentages of those speaking English less than very well.1 14
As the Oklahoma population continued to change, Oklahoma Representatives
Michael Christian, George Faught, and Randy Terrill, and Senator Anthony Sykes
authored and introduced House Joint Resolution 1042 ("HJR 1042") in February
2009.115 The Resolution eventually passed both houses of the Oklahoma Legislature in
May 2009.116 As passed, the Resolution directed the Secretary of State to place on the
107. I calculated this percentage by subtracting the English speaking population in 2008 from the English
speaking population in 2000. See Census 2000 Data for the State of Oklahoma, Selected Social Characteristics,
supra note 100 and Oklahoma Data Profile, Selected Social Characteristics, supra note 99.
108. Compare Oklahoma Data Profile, Selected Social Characteristics, supra note 99, with Census 2000
Data for the State of Oklahoma, Selected Social Characteristics, supra note 100.
109. Not only is this a reasonable inference because Native American languages do not clearly qualify as
any other language group, but a Census 2000 brief classified Native American languages as such, although the
2000 Census itself did not include an "other language" category. See Language Use and English-Speaking
Ability:2000, supra note 103, at 3.
110. Oklahoma Data Profile, Selected Social Characteristics, supra note 99. For a graphical representation
of the percentage of population represented by various language groups, see appendix C.
111. See generally Oklahoma Data Profile, Selected Social Characteristics, supra note 99; Census 2000
Data for the State of Oklahoma, Selected Social Characteristics, supra note 100. For a graphical representation
of the percentage of the Oklahoma population speaking English less than very well in each language group, see
appendix C.
112. See U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, United States Data Profile, Selected Social
Characteristics, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ADPTable? bm=y&-geoid=01 OOOUS&-
qrname=ACS_2008_1YR GOODP2&-ds name=ACS_2008_1YRG00_&-_1ang-en&-redoLog-false&-
format- (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
113. Id.
114. Id. See also appendix D for a graphical representation.
115. H.J. Res. 1042, 52d Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009). See also Michael McNutt, 2 Bills Will Get a
Second Chance: English-Only Policy Would Apply Only to Activities of Government, Daily Oklahoman, Jan.
15, 2009, at 9A.
116. The measure passed the House with 66 in favor, 32 against, and 2 excused. Okla. H.J. 24, 52d Leg., Ist
Reg. Sess. 26 (Mar. 11, 2009). The measure passed the Senate with 44 in favor, 2 against, and 2 excused. Okla.
Sen. J. 47, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 13 (Apr. 22, 2009). The Senate amended the measure to include numerous
authors including: Representatives Leslie Osborn, Mike Reynolds, Rex Duncan, Sally Kern, Sue Tibbs, Marian
Cooksey, and Mike Ritze, as well as Senators Cliff Branan, Steve Russell, Clark Jolley, Randy Brogdon, Glenn
Coffee, Cliff Aldridge, David Myers, Jim Halligan, Dan Newberry, Jim Reynolds, Bill Brown, Mike Johnson,
Don Barrington, Jonathan Nichols, Brian Bingman, Brian Crain, Ron Justice, John Ford, Bryce Marlatt, Gary
Stanislawski, and Mike Schulz. Okla. Sen. Amend. H. Jt. Res. 1042, 52d Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Apr. 22, 2009).
The Resolution with the Senate amendments passed the House by a vote of 89 in favor, 8 against, and 4
excused. Okla. H.J. No. 56, 52d Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. 9 (May 6, 2009). See also Michael McNutt, 'Official
English' Measure Expected to Appear on 2010 Ballot: Voters Will Get to Voice Decision on State Language,
DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 7, 2009, at 2A. Prior to its passage, the original language of HJR 1042 was
combined with a second official English bill in the Senate. Id The language of HJR 1042 as passed represents a
compromise between the two bills. Id.
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ballot for approval by Oklahoma voters a constitutional amendment creating Article
XXX in order to declare English the official language of Oklahoma. 117 The pertinent text
of Article XXX, as set out by the Oklahoma Legislature, was as follows:
As English is the common and unifying language of the State of Oklahoma, all official
actions of the state shall be conducted in the English language, except as required by
federal law. No person shall have a cause of action against an agency or political
subdivision of this state for failure to provide any official government actions in any
language other than English. Nothing in this Article shall be construed to diminish or
impair the use, study, development, or encouragement of any Native American language in
any context or for any purpose. The Legislature shall have the power to implement,
118
enforce, and determine the proper application of this Article by appropriate legislation.
After the Resolution passed both houses, the Legislature directed the Resolution to
the Oklahoma Secretary of State, who, with the help of the Attorney General, prepared
the measure for the ballot.119 Article XXX appeared on the November 2010 ballot and
passed with 75.54% of Oklahoma voters voting for the measure and 24.46% voting
against, the largest margin of victory for any of the state questions during the November
2010 general elections. 120
Although there may be other statutory or constitutional challenges pertinent to
Article XXX, this Comment focuses only on challenges related to the amendment's
infringement of speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.121 Early in United
117. Okla. H. Leg. Br., 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (May 2009).
118. Okla. H. Jt. Res. 1042, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. at § 1 (constitutionalized as Okla. Const. art. XXX
after the November 2010 general election).
119. Letter from W.A. Drew Edmonson, Okla. Atty. Gen., to Susan Savage, Okla. Sec. of St.; Glenn Coffee,
Okla. Sen. Pres. Pro Tempore; and Chris Benge, Okla. H.R. Speaker, Final Ballot Title for State Question No.
751, Legislative Referendum No. 351 (June 22, 2009) (available at
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/751.pdf). The measure appeared on the ballot as follows:
State Question No. 751 Legislative Referendum No. 351
This measure amends the State Constitution. It adds a new article to the Constitution. That article
deals with the State's official actions. It dictates the language to be used in taking official State
action. It requires that official State actions be in English. Native American languages could also be
used. When Federal law requires, other languages could also be used.
These language requirements apply to the State's "official actions." The term "official actions" is
not defined. The legislature could pass laws determining the application of the language
requirements. The Legislature would also pass laws implementing and enforcing the language
requirements.
No lawsuit based on State law could be brought on the basis of a State agency's failure to use a
language other than English. Nor could such a lawsuit be brought against political subdivisions of
the State.
SHALL THE PROPOSAL BE APPROVED?
FOR THE PROPOSAL YES AGAINST THE PROPOSAL NO
Id.
120. Okla. St. Election Bd., Summary Results: General Election - November 2, 2010, OKLAHOMA STATE
ELECTION BOARD, http://www.ok.gov/elections/support/l0gen.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2010).
121. It should be noted that days after the amendment's passage, Tulsa attorney and University of Tulsa
Professor of Law James Thomas filed suit against then-Governor Brad Henry, the State of Oklahoma, and the
Tulsa County Election Board on behalf of plaintiff Delilah Gentges, arguing that Article XXX violated the U.S.
Constitution's protection of free speech in the First Amendment. See Michael McNutt, Oklahoma English-Only
Measure Challenged, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 11, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 22514030. The lawsuit,
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States Supreme Court constitutional history, the Court ruled that the Bill of Rights and
its protections of individual liberties applied only to the federal government. 122
However, the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and its protection against
abridgement of some rights by state action spurred the Court to reconsider the
application of the Bill of Rights against the states.123 In Twining v. New Jersey, 124the
Court first acknowledged that, in some situations, the Fourteenth Amendment might
incorporate the protections of the Bill of Rights against the states.125 The Court reasoned
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required the rights' protection
against state action, as well as federal infringement, because a denial of the freedoms
protected by the Bill of Rights might amount to a denial of due process of law. 126
Several years later, the Court incorporated the First Amendment's protection of free
speechl27 against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. 128 Thus, the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution provides a means of
challenging state regulation of speech.129 Accordingly, this Comment discusses the
various First Amendment challenges arguably applicable against Oklahoma's Article
XXX as a state regulation of speech. 130
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, was filed in Tulsa County District Court and is styled Gentges v.
Henry, CV-2010-1324. This Comment expresses no opinion regarding the propriety of that lawsuit or its
prospects for success. Although Ms. Gentges makes similar challenges, this Comment is a purely academic
exercise, existing in the realm of the theoretical.
122. See Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833).
123. Following the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, a number of the amendment's framers argued that
they intended the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the protections of the Bill of Rights against the states.
For a comprehensive discussion of the debate over the framers' intent and incorporation, see ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CoNsTITuTIoNAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 491-94, 500-03 (3d ed., 2006). See also
The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). The Slaughter-Houses Cases represent the Court's first attempt
to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. In the cases, several New Orleans butchers challenged the City's
grant of a monopoly in the slaughterhouse business to the Crescent City Livestock Landing and Slaughter-
House Company. Id at 38. The plaintiff butchers alleged that the monopoly deprived them of their property
without due process of law, denied them equal protection of the laws, and abridged their privilege and
immunities of citizenship, all in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id at 36-38. Although the Court
rejected all of the plaintiff butchers' arguments, the case opened the door to the use of the Fourteenth
Amendment as a means of incorporating certain rights against the states. Id. at 82-83..
124. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
125. Id. at 99.
126. Id.
127. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
128. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). See also U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
129. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666-67. See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 48-49 (1985) (finding that "the
several States have no greater power to restrain the individual freedoms protected by the First Amendment than
does the Congress of the United States").
130. Unlike other forms of constitutional analysis, the First Amendment lacks a prescribed order of analysis.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 123, at 932. "There is no reason why one question should inherently precede
the others." Id. Accordingly, my analysis begins with the possibly fatal facial challenges to the amendment -
overbreadth and vagueness. My analysis will then consider the appropriate level of scrutiny, based on whether
the amendment constitutes a content-based or content-neutral restriction. It should be noted that this Comment
only briefly addresses one very important First Amendment challenge - prior restraint. A prior restraint bears
a " 'heavy presumption' against its constitutional validity." Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,
419 (1971). However, courts reviewing previous official English measures declined to address their respective
measures as prior restraints. This Comment likewise declines to analyze Article XXX as such. See infra note
314 for an extended discussion of the reasoning behind the doctrine's exclusion.""'
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BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE: OKLAHOMA'S NARROW INTERPRETATION
AvOIDs OvERBREADTH INVALIDATION, BUT "ADDS WEIGHT" TO A VAGUENESS
CHALLENGE
Unlike previous official English measures, the scope of Oklahoma's Article XXX
is limited to "official actions of the state." 1 31 Because of this, a reviewing court will
likely find Article XXX subject to narrowing construction and decline application of the
overbreadth doctrine to find Article XXX unconstitutionally overbroad.132 However, the
amendment may be open to constitutional challenge pursuant to the closely related
vagueness doctrine. 133
The Overbreadth Doctrine Is "Strong Medicine"
Unconstitutionally overbroad laws regulate substantially more speech than the U.S.
Constitution permits.134 Pursuant to the doctrine, a person not subject to speech
protection makes a facial challenge to the allegedly overbroad law, arguing the measure
is unconstitutional as applied to third parties.1 35 Successful facial challenges invalidate
the law in its entirety.136 The overbreadth doctrine contains two major aspects.13 7 First,
the court must find substantial overbreadth - that is, the challenged law must regulate
significantly more speech than the Constitution permits.138 Second, a person against
whom the law could be constitutionally applied must challenge the law, arguing the law
would be unconstitutional as applied to others. 139
Because the overbreadth doctrine provides a reviewing court the power to
invalidate a measure on its face, courts traditionally view overbreadth as "strong
medicine,"l40 and only apply the doctrine sparingly, "as a last resort."l41 The Supreme
Court declines to articulate an exact standard for the substantial overbreadth necessary to
fulfill the first aspect of the overbreadth doctrine.142 Instead, the Court traditionally
balances the number of situations in which the challenged measure may
unconstitutionally regulate protected speech against instances in which the measure's
application proves constitutional. 143 Put another way, "the overbreadth of a statute must
131. OKLA. CoNsT. art. XXX.
132. See infra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
133. See infra notes 198-213 and accompanying text.
134. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 123, at 943.
135. Id. at 943-44.
136. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 1247 (3d ed., 2009).
137. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 123, at 9443-47.
138. Id. at 943-46.
139. Id. at 946-47.
140. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
141. Id.
142. Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800
(1984) ("The concept of 'substantial overbreadth' is not readily reduced to an exact definition.").""'
143. See id. ("It is clear ... that the mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a
statute is not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge."); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 773 (1982) (The Court declined to find a New York statute prohibiting pornography overbroad because
the Court doubted that "these arguably impermissible applications of the statute amount to more than a tiny
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not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly
legitimate sweep." 144 By requiring a "substantial" showing, the doctrine strikes a
balance between two competing social costs - infringement on the free exchange of
ideas as a result of deterrence of protected speech versus the harmful effects of striking
down a law promoting state interests. 14 5 Reflecting courts' reluctance to apply the
doctrine, courts typically refuse application when the challenged measure is susceptible
to a limiting construction that cures any constitutional infirmity.146 However, precedent
shows that the Court will only accept a narrowing construction if the challenged measure
proves readily susceptible to such a construction in the first place.147 Thus, reviewing
courts often begin an overbreadth analysis by construing the challenged statute. 14 8
The Arizona and Alaska Supreme Courts Declined the "Strong Medicine"
The reviewing courts of previous official English measures declined application of
a narrowing construction, often contributing to findings of invalidity. 149 In construing
Arizona's original Article XXVIII, both the Ninth Circuit and Arizona Supreme Court
declined adoption of a proposed narrowing construction to limit Article XXVIII's scope
to official actions. 150 The Ninth Circuit declined to adopt the proposed construction,
concluding that to do so would be "completely at odds" with Article XXVIII's plain
language.1 5 1 Likewise, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected the narrowing construction,
basing its conclusion on three considerations: the measure's plain meaning, the
legislative intent, and avoiding ambiguity. 152 The court reasoned that "[b]y its express
terms, the Amendment is not limited to official governmental acts ... [r]ather, it is
plainly written in the broadest possible terms."153 The court also noted that the
legislature intended the measure's widespread application as evidenced by the inclusion
of several limited exceptions. 154 None of the enumerated exceptions qualified as an
official act, thus, proving unnecessary if the court adopted the limiting construction.155
Finally, the court concluded that the narrow construction injected unnecessary ambiguity
fraction of the materials within the statute's reach."); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760 (1974) ("This Court
has, however, repeatedly expressed its reluctance to strike down a statute on its face where there were a
substantial number of situations to which it might be validly applied.")."""'""
144. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.
145. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008).
146. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613 (The consequence of applying the overbreadth doctrine is "that any
enforcement of a statute thus placed at issue is totally forbidden until and unless a limiting construction or
partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected
expression."). See also Osbome v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (Court adopted a narrowing construction of
nudity in a child pornography statute in order to avoid finding the statute unconstitutionally overbroad).
147. Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988).
148. Williams, 553 U.S. at 293.
149. See Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 170 P.3d 183 (Alaska 2007); Ruiz v. Hull, 957
P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998).
150. See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 931 (9th Cir. 1995); Hull, 957 P.2d at 994.
151. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d at 929. For a more detailed discussion of the court's reasoning,
see supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
152. Hull, 957 P.2d at 992-94.
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into the statute, reasoning an average reader could not conclude they possessed the
freedom to use a language other than English while performing unofficial acts.15 6
The Alaska Supreme Court also found portions of Alaska's official English
provision unconstitutional. 157 However, unlike Arizona, Alaska's statute contained a
severability clause allowing the court to preserve a large portion of the measure. 15 8
Although the court concluded that limiting the statute's application to "official acts"
contradicted the plain language of section .320's first sentence, 159 the Court found the
second sentence included the word "official," thus, " 'plainly contemplating . .. a
category of informal, unofficial documents"' outside [the measure's] reach... ."160
Article XXX's Reviewing Court Will Likewise Decline the "Medicine"
Article XXX's limited application to "official actions of the state" serves to make
the measure susceptible to a narrowing construction and, thus, protected against a finding
of facial invalidity pursuant to the overbreadth doctrine.161 Unlike Arizona's first Article
XXVIII, the plain language of Oklahoma's amendment clearly supports a narrowing
construction. 162 By its express terms, the measure is limited to official government
acts. 163 By requiring that people conduct all "official actions" in English, the amendment
clearly contemplates a category of informal, unofficial actions not subject to the
requirement, much like Alaska's section .320.164 The amendment does not include
enumerated exceptions suggestive of any contrary legislative intent.165 Thus, Article
XXX contains none of the characteristics that prevented narrow construction of previous
official English measures. 166 Instead, the language of Article XXX proves readily
susceptible to a narrowing construction, much like that which might have saved
Arizona's first Article XXVIII.167 Since Article XXX is so susceptible, a reviewing
court will likely decline to apply the "strong medicine" of the overbreadth doctrine to
find the measure facially unconstitutional. 168
Vagueness - When Men of Common Intelligence Must Guess at Meaning
However, the same the narrowing construction that saves the amendment from
overbreadth makes Article XXX susceptible to a vagueness challenge.169 Overbreadth
156. Id. at 994.
157. Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 170 P.3d 183, 196, 209 (Alaska 2007).
158. Id. at 209.
159. Id. at 196.
160. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the Alaska statute's application and language, see supra notes 86-
91 and accompanying text.
161. See generally OKLA. CONST. art. XXX.
162. Compare supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
163. Compare supra note 153 and accompanying text.
164. Compare supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
165. Compare supra note 155 and accompanying text.
166. See Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 170 P.3d 183, 196 (Alaska 2007); Ruiz v. Hull,
957 P.2d 984, 993-94 (Ariz. 1998).
167. See Mackin, supra note 53, at 350. See also Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Assn., Inc., 484 U.S. 397
(1988).
168. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613-15 (1973).
169. See Hull, 957 P.2d at 994 n.7. See also In re Initiative Petition No. 366, 46 P.3d 123, 128 (Okla. 2002).
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and vagueness are "closely related" doctrines.170 Like overbreadth, a finding of
unconstitutional vagueness invalidates the challenged measure on its face.171 Opponents
of a particular measure may challenge it on both overbreadth and vagueness grounds. 172
However, a reviewing court may uphold a law against an overbreadth challenge but find
the same measure unconstitutionally vague, or vice versa. 173 To find a law
unconstitutionally vague, a court must find that "men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application . . . ."174 That is, a law
proves impermissibly vague unless ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and what conduct is not.175 This requirement serves to protect the innocent
from entrapment by providing fair warning, as well as to prevent arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. 176 Despite the doctrine's general applicability to all kinds of
measures, 177 the Supreme Court requires stricter standards of permissible vagueness to
laws affecting and regulating the exercise of speech rights.178 The Court reasons, "[First
Amendment] freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our
society. The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions.,
179
Oklahoma previously found an official English measure void for vagueness.180
The Oklahoma Supreme Court labeled Petition No. 366 a "classic example" of an
unconstitutionally vague statute, reasoning that its prohibitions would deter citizens from
exercising their constitutional right to freedom of speech.181 The court feared the
measure would force citizens to avoid lawful conduct in order to avoid entering "the
forbidden zone."l 82 The court also expressed concern that the statute's prohibitions
would only become clear after " 'courts . . . proceeded on a case-by-case basis to
separate out constitutional from unconstitutional areas of coverage.' ,,183 Neither the
Arizonal84 nor the Alaska Supreme Courtl85 specifically addressed vagueness, finding
170. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 123, at 948-49. See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
171. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 136, at 1247.
172. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 123, at 948.
173. Id.
174. Connally v. Gen. Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
175. Id. See also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399,
402-03 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 366-67 (1964).
176. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09 ("A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to
policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of
arbitrary and discriminatory application.").
177. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (application to gang loitering ordinance);
Kolender, 461 U.S. 352 (loitering ordinance); Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (application to
vagrancy law).
178. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959).
179. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). The Court also noted that First Amendment rights need
"breathing space to survive," thus justifying the narrow specificity. Id.
180. In re Initiative Petition No. 366, 46 P.3d 123, 128 (Okla. 2002). For a discussion of Petition No. 366's
language, see supra notes 10-21 and accompanying text.
181. In re Initiative Petition No. 366,46 P.3d at 128.
182. Id.
183. Id. (quoting Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 516 (1964)).
184. Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998).
185. Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 170 P.3d 183 (Alaska 2007).
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their respective state measures unconstitutional on other grounds.186 However, the
Arizona Supreme Court noted that adopting the Attorney General's proposed limiting
construction (narrowing Article XXVIII's application to official actions) "would
undoubtedly add weight to the plaintiffs' vagueness argument."1 87
Apart from official English measures, the Supreme Court invalidated on vagueness
grounds other measures restricting the speech of public employees.188 In Baggett v.
Bullitt,189 the Supreme Court invalidated two Washington state statutes requiring public
employees to take loyalty oaths as a condition of public employment. 190 The Court
struck down the statutes as unconstitutionally vague, reasoning that the oath's indefinite
language failed to differentiate prohibited conduct sufficiently. 191 The Court noted that
employees "avoid the risk of loss of employment, and perhaps profession, only by
restricting their conduct to that which is unquestionably safe. Free speech may not be so
inhibited."1 92
Likewise, the Supreme Court, pursuant to the vagueness doctrine, struck down
portions of a New York scheme aimed at prohibiting public employment of so called
"subversive persons."1 93 The policy incorporated portions of the New York State Code
(requiring termination for treasonous or seditious utterances or actions) into employee
contracts.1 94 The Court reasoned that the statutes did not clearly define either
"treasonous" or "seditious," leaving employees without a clear delineation between
permissible and impermissible utterances. 195 Since the contracts incorporated three
186. See supra notes 59-73 and supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
187. Hull, 957 P.2d at 994 n.7.
188. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of U. of State of N. Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961) (invalidating an oath requiring public
employees to swear that they never aided the Communist Party, reasoning the oath failed to inform what
conduct was prohibited).
189. Baggett, 377 U.S. 360.
190. The first oath, applicable only to teachers, required the employee to state:
I solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the constitution and laws of the United States of
America and of the State of Washington and will by precept and example promote respect for the
flag and the institutions of the United States of America and the State of Washington, reverence for
law and order, and undivided allegiance to the government of the United States.
Id. at 361-62.The second oath, applicable to all state employees, required employees to affirm that they were
not members of any subversive organization, defined as any organization which engages in "or advocates ...
or teaches [activities] intended to overthrow, destroy or alter ... the constitutional form of the government of
the United States, or of the state of Washington." Id. at 362. The oath also included a stipulation that the
"subversive party" distinction included the Communist Party, thus prohibiting oathtakers from membership in
the Communist Party. Id
191. Id. at 372.
192. Id.
193. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 597-605.
194. Id. at 596-97. The majority of the plaintiffs in the suit were actually terminated for their failure to sign
the so-called 'Feinberg Certificate,' which required the employee to attest that they did not claim membership
in the Communist Party. Id. at 596. The Certificate also required the employee to disclose to the University's
president if the employee ever previously counted themselves as a member the Communist Party. Id. at 592.
However, during the course of the litigation, the State rescinded the Feinberg Certificate. Id. at 596. Instead, the
State informed employees that several New York statutes constituted part of their contract. Id. This included
N.Y. Educ. Law § 3021 (McKinney 1947) and N.Y. Civ. Serv. § 105 (McKinney 1958), calling for termination
due to treasonable or seditious actions or utterances, which this case considered. Interestingly, both of these
measures remain on New York's books. Id.""
195. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 598-99.
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separate statutes, as well as administrative enforcement measures, the Court also
concluded that the "[v]agueness of wording [was] aggravated by proxlixity and profusion
of statutes, regulations, and administrative machinery, and by manifold cross-references
to interrelated enactments and rules."l96 Essentially, the Court questioned whether
"treasonous" and "seditious" required identical interpretation in each statute, and if such
a reading was required, if the various provisions that an employee must refer to for a
definition supported such a reading.197
Men of Common Intelligence Will Guess at the Meaning ofArticle XYX
The Oklahoma Legislature's failure to explicitly define "official actions" could
result in Article XXX's ultimate invalidation as unconstitutionally vague.198 Rather than
defining official actions, the amendment instead provides that "[t]he Legislature shall
have the power to implement, enforce, and determine the proper application of [Article
XXX] by appropriate legislation."l 99 The official ballot language also addressed this
portion of Article XXX's language, explaining, "[t]he term 'official actions' is not
defined. The Legislature could pass laws determining the application of the language
requirements."200 However, as of the time of this writing, the legislature failed to act in
order to define "official actions," leaving the Oklahoma government subject to the
English-language requirement without the necessary corollary definitions.201 Oklahoma
citizens must "guess at its meaning" and will likely "differ to its application," a hallmark
of unconstitutionally vague measures.202 Such ambiguity does not meet the stricter
standards applied to laws affecting speech rights.203 Citizens may refrain from exercising
speech rights for fear of entering into the "forbidden zone," a concern that ultimately
contributed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court's invalidation of Petition No. 366.204 Public
employees in particular may refrain from exercising their complete speech rights in an
effort to avoid the risk of loss of employment and profession, a concern expounded on in
Baggett.205 The lack of exceptions in the article only highlights this concern, providing
no guidance to public employees about when their 'official actions' end, and 'unofficial
actions' begin.206 As in Baggett, "[f]ree speech may not be so inhibited." 2 07
196. Id at 604.
197. Id at 597-603.
198. See OKLA. CONST. art. XXX. Oklahoma's amendment stands in contrast to Arizona's current Article
XXVIII, which expressly defines "official action." See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text for a more
detailed discussion of Arizona's current Article XXVIII.
199. OKLA. CONST. art. XXX.
200. Letter, supra note 119. See also supra note 119 (setting forth State Question 751 as it appeared on the
November 2010 general election ballot).
201. The legislature took no action to define the term prior to the amendment's passage in November 2010.
The next legislative session after the election did not convene until the first Monday in February 2011. At a
minimum, this resulted in three months of the amendment being part of the Oklahoma Constitution without a
legislative definition of "official action."
202. See Connally v. Gen. Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
203. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959).
204. See In re Initiative Petition No. 366, 46 P.3d 123, 128 (Okla. 2002).
205. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 272 (1964). See also Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of U. of State of N.
Y., 385 U.S. 589, 597-603 (1967).
206. Article XXX contains only one exception, compliance with federal law. See OKLA. CONST. art. XXX.
Outside of this, the amendment provides no guidance as to what actions are excepted from its reach. Id. A
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The methods of defining "official actions" likewise present problems pursuant to
the vagueness doctrine.208 Until the Legislature defines "official actions," judicial review
of alleged violations on a case-by-case basis provides the only means to separate
prohibited from not prohibited conduct, as well as define the scope of the amendment's
application.209 Both the United States and Oklahoma Supreme Court previously
expressed displeasure with such case-by-case adjudication of constitutional questions.210
However, the Legislature's ultimate definition may likewise pose problems, only
working to aggravate the vagueness of wording rather than providing clarity or scope.211
The Legislature will presumably define "official actions" through resolutions creating
statutory law.212 Although arguably not to the same extent, the necessity of cross-
referencing statutory law with Article XXX, as well as any future administrative
regulations, serves only to aggravate the vagueness issue in a manner similar to New
York's policy against hiring "subversive persons." 2 13
Thus, although Article XXX's limitation to "official actions" likely protects the
amendment from unconstitutional overbreadth, the very same limitation opens the
amendment up to challenge pursuant to the vagueness doctrine.2 14 Additionally, the
legislative scheme provided for in Article XXX and presented to the citizens on the
ballot, rather than remedying the vagueness, likely serves only to aggravate the
ambiguity.215
MAKING THE CHOICE - DOES ARTICLE XXX CONSTITUTE A CONTENT-BASED OR
CONTENT-NEUTRAL SPEECH REGULATION?
Despite Article XXX's narrow construction, a reviewing court may still classify
the amendment as a blanket bar of speech due to the unavailability of alternative means
of communication.216 Additionally, the court may find the amendment unjustified
without reference to the speech's content, which, combined with the lack of alternatives
hypothetical fact scenario helps to illustrate potential problems resulting from this. A primarily Vietnamese
speaking couple goes to the Tulsa County Courthouse in order to apply for a marriage license. It seems clear
that the marriage license itself must be in English as an official document of the State of Oklahoma. However,
to what extent must the court clerk's office employee's conversation with the couple be in English?
Presumably, directions as to how to fill out the license must be in English. Can the employee make idle small
talk with the couple in Vietnamese if the employee has proficiency in the language, or does the entire
transaction qualify as an official action?
207. 377 U.S. at 372.
208. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 604; In re Initiative Petition No. 366,46 P.3d at 128.
209. See In re Initiative Petition No. 366,46 P.3d at 128.
210. See Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964); In re Initiative Petition No. 366, 46 P.3d at
128.
211. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 604.
212. See Letter, supra note 119. It is unlikely that the Legislature would attempt to amend the Oklahoma
Constitution each time it wishes to revise its definition of "official action" due to the extensive procedure in
order to do so. See OKLA. CONST. art. XXIV.
213. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 597-604. See also supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
214. See Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 994 n.7 (Ariz. 1998). See also In re Initiative Petition No. 366, 46 P.3d
at 128; supra notes 198-207 and accompanying text.
215. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 604; Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 515; In re Initiative Petition No. 366, 46 P.3d at
128. See also supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text.
216. See infra notes 250-55 and accompanying text.
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for communication, must prompt a court to classify Article XXX as a content-based
restriction. 2 17
Content-Based Restrictions Regulate and Judge Speech
Although the original intent of the Constitution's framers remains a topic of
debate, scholars postulate several theories for continued protection of free speech in
American society.218 Possible justifications for speech protection include discovering
truth through a "marketplace of ideas,"219 advancing autonomy by protecting self-
expression,220 and encouraging tolerance.221 In light of these considerations, the
Supreme Court declared that at the core of the First Amendment lies the idea that the
government cannot regulate speech based on its content. 222 That is, "[a]bove all else, the
First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."223 Thus, in order to be content-
neutral, the regulation in question must be both viewpoint and subject matter neutral. 224
The Supreme Court declared content-based measures presumptively invalid. 225In
order to pass constitutional muster, content-based speech restrictions must meet strict
scrutiny.2 26 Pursuant to a strict scrutiny analysis, the government bears the burden of
proving the law in question is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government
interest.227 In contrast, the Court subjects content-neutral speech restrictions to an
intermediate level of scrutiny. 22 8 A regulation passes intermediate scrutiny provided the
regulation is justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, is
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leaves open ample
217. See infra notes 256-62 and accompanying text.
218. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 123, at 925-30. Chemerinsky notes that the framers definitely intended
the First Amendment to prohibit licensing restraints on publication and punishment for libel which frequently
occurred in England. Id. at 922-24. However, beyond that, the historical record remains inconclusive,
particularly in light of several of the framers' participation in adopting the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. Id
219. Id. at 926-27. See also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Homes, J., dissenting)
("But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believeeven more
than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by
free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.").
220. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 123, at 929-30. See also Tumer Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641
(1994) ("At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or
herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. Our political system and
cultural life rest upon this ideal."); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427-28 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) ("The First Amendment serves not only the needs of the polity but also those of the human spirit-
a spirit that demands self-expression. Such expression is an integral part of the development of ideas and a
sense of identity. To suppress expression is to reject the basic human desire for recognition and affront the
individual's worth and dignity.") (footnote omitted).
221. Id at 930.
222. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 136, at 1214.
223. Police Dep't of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
224. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 136, at 1214.
225. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 136, at 1214.
226. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 642.
227. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 101.
228. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 642.
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alternative channels for communication of the information.229 The Court traditionally
views the government's purpose in adopting the regulation as the controlling
consideration in classifying a regulation as content neutral or content based.230 In other
words, "the 'principal inquiry in determining content neutrality ... is whether the
government has adopted a regulation of speech because of [agreement or] disagreement
with the message it conveys.' "231
Arizona and Alaska Regulated Speech Based on Content
Both the Alaska and Arizona Supreme Courts concluded that their state's
respective official English measures constituted a content-based, rather than content-
neutral, speech restriction.232 In regard to Arizona's first Article XXVIII, proponents of
the amendment argued the measure only regulated modes of communication, as opposed
to pure speech rights.233 Thus, proponents contended, the Arizona Supreme Court must
properly classify the amendment as a content-neutral regulation and apply intermediate
scrutiny.234 The court rejected this interpretation, however, reasoning that Article
XXVIII effectively barred communication between the Arizona government and its
citizens with limited English speaking abilities, without providing non-English speaking
persons an alternative means through which to communicate with the government. 235
This blanket bar failed to qualify as a restriction on the mode of communication because
content-neutral restrictions, "by definition, assume and require the availability of
alternative means of communication."236
In another effort to claim that Article XXVIII did not reach pure speech,
proponents analogized the decision to speak another language to expressive conduct.237
Courts traditionally afford the government wider latitude in regulating expressive
conduct,238 requiring the application of relaxed scrutiny.239 In language adopted by the
Arizona Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, reasoning, "[s]peech in
any language is still speech, and the decision to speak in another language is a decision
229. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). Although the regulation must be
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, the regulation need not be the least restrictive
means pursuant to intermediate scrutiny. See also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725-26 (2000); Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).
230. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
231. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 642 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).
232. See Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 170 P.3d 183, 205-06 (Alaska 2007); Ruiz v.
Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 998-1000 (Ariz. 1998).
233. Hull, 957 P.2d at 998.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 997-98.
236. Id. at 998.
237. Id at 999. Although the Arizona Supreme Court took up the expressive conduct issue, the Court
dismissed the claim with minimal discussion. Id. Instead, the court adopted the Ninth's Circuit reasoning in
also rejecting the claim. Id. For the Ninth Circuit's extended discussion, see Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official
English, 69 F.3d 920, 934-36 (9th Cir. 1995).
238. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d at 934 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (burning
American flag for expressive reasons); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(wearing arm band for expressive reasons); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning draft card
for expressive reasons).
239. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d at 934.
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involving speech alone."240 The Ninth Circuit also noted "[w]hen the effect of banning a
form of speech is to prevent receipt of the message by the intended audience, it cannot
seriously be argued that the ban is innocuous because it applies only to the mode of
speech." 24 1 Thus, the court found considering only the speech's form "wholly
mechanical and artificial" and "ill serv[ing] the purpose of the Bill of Rights and
denigrat[ing] the judicial function."242 Because the Arizona Supreme Court employed
this reasoning to reject arguments for decreased scrutiny, it applied strict scrutiny to
conclude Article XXVIII violated the First Amendment. 24 3
The Alaska Supreme Court likewise classified the Alaska provision as content-
based and applied strict scrutiny, finding the measure unconstitutional.244 It agreed with
and adopted the language of the Ninth Circuit and Arizona Supreme Court in rejecting
the measure as a regulation of expressive conduct,245 as well as the classifying the
provision as a content-based restriction because of the lack of alternative means of
communication.246 In so holding, the court emphasized the restrictive nature of complete
speech bans, expressing concern that "some voices will be silenced, some ideas will
remain unspoken, and some ideas will remain unchallenged."2 47
Article MXX Likewise Regulates Speech Based on Content
A reviewing court in a constitutional challenge will likely classify Oklahoma's
Article XXX as a content-based restriction and apply strict scrutiny.248 Article XXX's
narrow construction does not affect a reviewing court's consideration of whether the
amendment regulates speech itself.249 Thus, a court will likely adopt the reasoning of the
Ninth Circuit and its predecessors and decline to classify Article XXX as a regulation of
expressive conduct. 250
The narrowing construction may affect a court's analysis of alternative means of
communication, though.251 Despite Article XXX's narrow construction, the amendment
fails to provide an alternative means of official access to the government for non-English
240. Id. at 936. See also Hull, 957 P.2d at 999.
241. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d at 936 n.21.
242. Id.
243. Hull, 957 P.2d at 1000. The court also noted that Article XXVIII failed even intermediate scrutiny for
its broad infringement of speech rights. Id.
244. Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 170 P.3d 183, 206 (Alaska 2007).
245. Id at 205 (quoting Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d at 936 ("Speech in any language is still
speech, and the decision to speak in another language is a decision involving speech alone.")). For an extended
discussion of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, also adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court, see supra notes 237-
43 and accompanying text.
246. Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc., 170 P.3d at 206. For a complete articulation of the Arizona
Supreme Court's reasoning on which the Alaska Supreme Court relied, see supra notes 232-36 and
accompanying text.
247. Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc., 170 P.3d at 206.
248. See generally Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
249. The Ninth Circuit's assertion that "[sipeech in any language is still speech, and the decision to speak in
another language is a decision involving speech alone" proves applicable regardless of the amendment's scope.
Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d at 936.
250. See supra notes 237-43 and accompanying text.
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speakers. 252 Thus, like Arizona's first Article XXVIII, Article XXX effectively bars
non-English speakers from communication, albeit only official, with the government. 253
However, Article XXX presumably leaves available unofficial means of communication
with the government.254 A reviewing court must determine if unofficial means of
communication provide sufficient options for non-English speakers to constitute the
alternative means of communication necessary for classification as a content-neutral
regulation.2 55
Regardless of whether unofficial communication constitutes a sufficient alternative
means of communication, a reviewing court will likely classify Article XXX as a
content-based restriction because the amendment cannot be justified without reference to
the content of the restricted speech.256 Official English measures regulate pure speech
rather than modes of communication, thus implicitly finding the chosen language a part
of the speech's content.257 Representative Randy Terrill, one of the primary House
authors of HJR 1042, stated three purposes for Article XXX: preventing people from
demanding taxpayer-funded services in a language other than English, eliminating the
costs of bilingualism, and avoiding the divisive effects of bilingualism. 25 These
purposes cannot be justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,
particularly the desire to avoid the divisive effects of bilingualism. 2 59 By concluding that
bilingualism creates divisiveness, the State implicitly makes a judgment of agreement or
disagreement with the message that the speech conveys.260 Likewise, the State's
purported justification of preventing people from demanding taxpayer-funded services
has everything to do with content. 2 6 1 Excluding the use of other languages during the
performance of taxpayer-funded services, presumably official actions, raises the concern
that "some voices will be silenced, some ideas will remain unspoken, and some ideas
will remain unchallenged." 262
252. See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text.
253. OKLA. CONST. art. XXX. See also supra note 235 and accompanying text.
254. See OKLA. CONST. art. XXX.
255. See supra notes 229, 234-36, as well as the accompanying text.
256. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791-93 (1989).
257. See supra notes 232-44. See also Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 936 n.21
(9th Cir. 1995).
258. Interview by Oklahoma House of Representatives Press with Rep. Randy Terrill, Okla. H.R. (Mar. 11,
2009). The Supreme Court expressed willingness to consider legislative history in order to determine the
governmental interest meant to be promoted by a statute. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567-
68 (1991). Thus, as one of the primary House authors, Rep. Terrill's insight will likely prove probative to a
reviewing court. See id. Additionally, the three primary rationales that he cites in support of the amendment are
those frequently cited by national organizations in official English movements across the country. See Why Is
Official English Necessary?, U.S. ENGLISH, http://www.us-english.org/view/10 (last visited Dec. 18, 2010).'
259. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791-93.
260. See Tumer Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).
261. Compare Ward, 491 U.S. at 792 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988)). The Court found
the sound-amplification guidelines in question applied to all performers at the bandshell venue, without regard
to the type of music played, and were justified by the City's desire to avoid undue intrusion into the area's
sedate character. Id. at 803. Thus, the Court found that the sound-amplification guidelines in questions "ha[d]
nothing to do with content." Id. at 792. Conversely, Article XXX does not apply without regard to the type of
language used. Instead, it specifically exempts English as well as Native American languages. Analogizing
Article XXX to Ward, it is as if the sound-amplification guidelines applied to all music except jazz. Because of
this, Article XXX clearly has something to do with content.
262. See Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 170 P.3d 183, 206 (Alaska 2007).
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Thus, Article XXX reflects a legislative judgment of disagreement with the
affected speech - official communication in a language other than English.263 Although
Article XXX seemingly allows unofficial means of communication with the government,
such communication may provide an insufficient alternative in light of the important
constitutional rights implicated.264 Because of these considerations, a reviewing court
will likely classify Article XXX as a content-based restriction.265
FACING THE CONSEQUENCES - APPLYING STRICT AND INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY TO
ARTICLE XXX TO DETERMINE CONSTITUTIONALITY
Assuming that Article XXX qualifies as a content-based restriction, a reviewing
court must apply strict scrutiny in a constitutional challenge.266 Due to the availability of
less restrictive means, Article XXX will likely fail a strict scrutiny analysis. 26 7 However,
should a reviewing court decline to classify Article XXX as a content-based restriction,
and, instead, define the amendment as content-neutral, the court must apply intermediate
scrutiny, a relaxed standard of review pursuant to which Article XXX will likely pass
constitutional muster.26 8
Strict Scrutiny Requires a Compelling Interest and Narrow Tailoring
Strict scrutiny requires that the challenged measure be narrowly tailored to achieve
a compelling government interest.269 Narrow tailoring requires that the means chosen
constitute the least restrictive means of accomplishing the State's purposes. 270
Alaska andArizona Failed to Narrowly Tailor
Alaska's official English provision did not represent the least restrictive means of
accomplishing the State's purposes, leading the Alaska Supreme Court to ultimately
declare portions of the provision unconstitutional. 27 1 First considering the provision's
purported goal of "promoting, preserving, and strengthening the use of English,"272 the
court noted the availability of numerous alternatives through which to accomplish the
objective.273 Thus, the Alaska provision did not constitute the least restrictive means of
promoting and strengthening the English language.274 The court next considered the
State's fiscal interest in an efficient government and likewise identified reasonable
263. See Turner Broad Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 642 (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791). See also supra notes
256-62.
264. See Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc., 170 P.3d at 205-06. See also supra notes 246-51.
265. See Turner Broad Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 642.
266. Id
267. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). See also infra notes 294-
308.
268. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 642. See also infra notes 323-34.
269. Police Dep't of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972).
270. Playboy Entm t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. at 813. See also Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz,
170 P.3d 183, 208 (Alaska 2007).
271. See Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc., 170 P.3d at 207-09.
272. Id at 208. See also ALASKA STAT. § 44.13.300.
273. Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc., 170 P.3d at 208. The court suggested creating and funding
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alternatives, again preventing the Alaska provision from constituting the least restrictive
means.275 By using more restrictive means than necessary, the Alaska provision
attempted to "coerce its lawful objectives by methods that conflict with the core
protections of the United States ... Constitution,"276 rendering the provision
unconstitutional. 277
The Arizona Supreme Court likewise concluded that the State failed to narrowly
tailor the first Article XXVIII to its purposes.278 However, unlike the Alaska Supreme
Court, the Arizona Supreme Court declined to find a compelling state interest. 279 The
State's failure to articulate a compelling interest mattered little in the end because the
court noted that even if they found a compelling interest, Article XXVIII failed the
narrow specificity requirement.280 Although the court acknowledged the State's ability
to regulate speech in some circumstances,281 Article XXVIII constituted a "general
prohibition" of speech rather than a regulation. 282 Reasoning that the amendment's goal
of promoting English did not require such a blanket restriction, the court concluded that
Article XXVIII could not constitute the least restrictive means due to its failure to
narrowly regulate speech and, thus, failed strict scrutiny analysis. 283 The court expressed
particular concern that the amendment deprived elected officials and public employees of
the ability to communicate with members of the public with limited English speaking
abilities.284 Article XXVIII "went too far," beyond permissible language policies, and
"effectively [cut] off governmental communication with thousands of limited-English-
proficient and non-English speaking persons . . . ."285 Article XXVIII's broad
application particularly troubled the court for its failure to make some consideration for
public employees and officials with the ability and desire to communicate in a language
other than English.2 86 This failure infringed on a "core value" 287 of the First
Amendment, the free discussion of political affairs, and it contributed to 'Article
XXVIII's first ultimate invalidation as unconstitutional. 288
275. Id. The court suggested the state legislature promulgate legislation clearly relieving the Alaska
government of responsibility for providing services in languages other than English.
276. Id. at 209.
277. Id.
278. Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 1001 (Ariz. 1998).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. The court referenced Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (permitting regulation of time, place,
and manner restrictions under the First Amendment). Id
282. Hull, 957 P.2d at 1001.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 997.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 997-98. Specifically, the court noted that in some instances, communicating in the primary
language of a person proficient in English as a second language proved more efficient. Id. at 998. However, the
amendment made this more efficient method illegal, belying any possible state interest in efficient government.
Id.
287. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("Whatever differences may exist about
interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.").
288. Hull, 957 P.2d at 998.
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Article XXY Is Not Narrowly Tailored, Despite a Compelling Interest
Proponents of Oklahoma's Article XXX identify purposes similar to those of
Alaska and Arizona as the foundation of the amendment. 289 Article XXX supporters first
allege that the amendment serves to prevent Oklahoma residents from requesting
taxpayer-funded services in a language other than English. 290 As additional protection
against multilingual government services, Article XXX specifically provides that "[n]o
person shall have a cause of action against an agency or political subdivision of this state
for failure to provide any official government actions in any language other than
English."291 Supporters allege that prohibiting multilingualism in official government
services and actions promotes fiscal, as well as administrative, efficiency. 2 92 Rep.
Terrill, one of the amendment's primary House authors, cites the case of an Iranian
couple who requested a driver's license exam in Farsi and subsequently filed suit against
Oklahoma upon the request's denial to support his claim that multilingualism burdens
the State. 293
However, a reviewing court will likely conclude less restrictive means equally
promote fiscal and administrative efficiency. 294 As the Alaska Supreme Court suggested,
legislation clearly relieving the state of responsibility for providing "official" services in
languages other than English promotes fiscal efficiency, but only narrowly infringes
speech.2 95 Rep. Terrill's example, meant to illustrate the burdens of multilingualism,
also provides an apt example of the propriety of legislating the use of English in
government services, rather than constitutionalizing its use. 296 Presumably, Oklahoma
may constitutionally limit the administration of driver's license exams to the English
language.297 Although some authority exists in other jurisdictions suggesting such a
policy violates the Civil Rights Act of 1964,298 neither the Tenth Circuit nor the United
289. See supra notes 272-75 and accompanying text. See also OKLA. CONST. art. XXX.
290. Interview, supra note 258.
291. OKLA. CONST. art. XXX.
292. Interview, supra note 258.
293. Id. Although just one example, Rep. Terrill alleges that this "demand" to accommodate other languages
has "really gotten out of hand." Id. Rep. Terrill alleges that since institution of the suit by the Iranian couple,
several other people have requested driver's licenses in other languages. Id.
294. See supra notes 272-77 and accompanying text. See also United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc.,
529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
295. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
296. See Interview, supra note 258.
297. See OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 36 ("The authority of the Legislature shall extend to all rightful subjects of
legislation . . . ."). See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 6-101 (West 2009).
298. In the last decade, this issue perplexed the Alabama state court system as well as the Eleventh Circuit.
In 1990, Alabama ratified an amendment to the state constitution making English the official language of the
state and providing that state officials shall "take all steps necessary to insure that the role of English as the
common language . . . is preserved and enhanced." ALA. CONST. art. I §, 36.01. Following the amendment's
passage, the Alabama Department of Public Safety promulgated an official policy of administering its driver's
exam only in the English language. Martha Sandoval filed suit on behalf of the citizens of Alabama with
limited English proficiency, alleging the policy was unlawful and unconstitutional. Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F.
Supp. 2d 1234, 1244 (M.D. Ala. 1998). Both the Middle District of Alabama and Eleventh Circuit concluded
that the policy constituted a disparate impact on the basis of national origin in violation of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. See Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 511 (1lth Cir. 1999); Sandoval v. Hagan, 7 F. Supp.
2d 1234, 1315 (M.D. Ala. 1998). The United States Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that Title VI did
not provide for private causes of action, without reaching the propriety of the department's policy. Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001). However, after the Eleventh Circuit's ruling, the Department of Public
5032011
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States Supreme Court reached this issue, leaving Oklahoma free to promulgate an
official English policy in licensing exams and other government services. 299 Because
legislation relieving the government of responsibility to provide official services in
languages other than English also serves the State's interest in government efficiency,
Article XXX does not constitute the least restrictive means of promoting this interest and
cannot withstand strict scrutiny. 300
Proponents of Article XXX also seek to justify the amendment by alleging that the
measure serves a compelling interest in preventing the divisive effects of
bilingualism. 30 1 Although phrased differently, this interest essentially equates to the
interests of the citizens of Alaska in promoting English as a common language. 302 As in
Alaska, less restrictive means equally promote this purpose. 30 3 The Oklahoma
Legislature possesses the power of appropriation304 and, thus, the ability to allocate
funds to programs promoting the English language.305 For example, the Legislature
could fund an adult-education program designed to teach English to adults with limited
English proficiency or allocate more resources to public schools to promote the English
language among children. 306 However, Article XXX fails to do so. 307 Instead, the
amendment generally prohibits official communications between the government and
persons with limited English proficiency.308 Thus, although narrower in application than
Safety changed the policy and began to administer driver's exams in languages other than English. As a result
of the policy change, several members of a pro-official English group filed suit, alleging that the new policy
violated Alabama's official English amendment. Defendants, various Alabama officials, alleged that because
the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's decision on procedural grounds, the Circuit's decision that
the policy violated Title VI remained binding precedent. The Alabama Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs
failed to adequately allege a genuine issue of material fact concerning the new multilingualism policy's impact
on the preservation of English in the State, and, thus, the plaintiffs' claim could not survive summary judgment.
Cole v. Riley, 989 So. 2d 1001, 1005 (Ala. 2007). In so holding, the court specifically declined to address the
precedential value of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484. Id. Thus, the
propriety of driver's exams given only in English remains at issue, leaving Oklahoma free to implement such a
policy.""'"'""'"'
299. See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 279.
300. See Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. at 813. See also Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v.
Kritz, 170 P.3d 183, 208 (Alaska 2007).
301. Interview, supra note 258. Rep. Terrill cites Quebec, the Canadian province, as an example of the
"inherently divisive" effects of multilingualism. Id. Rep. Terrill alleges that the citizens of Quebec, as a
linguistic minority, are actively seeking to secede from Canada, and that an "increasing number" of Americans
are becoming concerned a similar situation may arise in this country. Id.
302. The text of Article XXX supports such a reading, calling English the "common and unifying language"
of the State of Oklahoma. OKLA. CONST. art. XXX. See also ALASKA STAT. § 44.12.300; Alaskans for a
Common Language, Inc., 170 P.3d at 208.
303. See Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc., 170 P.3d at 208.
304. See OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 36.
305. See OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 55.
306. Id. The authority to allocate funds to public schools stems from OKLA. CONST. art. 13, § 1(a). In Meyer
v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the states possessed a legitimate interest in promoting
American ideals and preparing students for civic duties. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Although this interest did not
justify the Nebraska statute at issue (a complete ban on teaching any language other than English to children
not yet in the eighth grade), the Court's reasoning justifies programs that promote civic development without
doing so by prohibited means and at the cost of infringement of other, more fundamental, rights. Id.
307. In fact, the amendment fails to provide any means through which to accomplish its objectives. OKLA.
CONST. art. XXX. Instead, Article XXX provides that the Oklahoma Legislature will determine the
amendment's "proper application" later. See id.
308. Id. (providing "all official actions of the State shall be conducted in the English language"). See also
Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 1001 (Ariz. 1998).
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Arizona's first Article XXVIII, 309 Article XXX may implicate some of the same
concerns that prompted the Arizona Supreme Court to invalidate its state's
amendment.3 10 In the name of unity, Article XXX effectively cuts off limited-English
proficient and non-English speaking persons in Oklahoma from official governmental
communication. 3 11 A reviewing court must decide if this prohibition on official
government communication also "goes too far" and poses a significant threat to a core
value of the First Amendment - protection of political speech. 312
Thus, despite the narrowing interpretation, a reviewing court may still conclude
that Article XXX constitutes a blanket restriction of speech313 and an attempt to coerce
its objectives by means in conflict with the First Amendment. 3 14 If so, a reviewing court
will not find Article XXX sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass constitutional strict
scrutiny. 3 15
Intermediate Scrutiny Permits Substantial Interests Achieved Less Effectively Absent the
Regulation
Despite the aforementioned arguments in support of classifying Article XXX as a
content-based restriction, a reviewing court might conclude that Article XXX proves
justified without reference to the speech's content and classify the regulation as content-
neutral.3 16 Should the court classify Article XXX as a content-neutral restriction, the
reviewing court must apply intermediate scrutiny in any constitutional challenge to the
amendment. 317 Under this relaxed level of scrutiny, the amendment must prove narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest in order to pass constitutional
muster.3 18 Pursuant to intermediate scrutiny, the challenged measure need not represent
the least restrictive means of achieving the government's purposes.3 19 In other words, a
reviewing court need not invalidate a content-neutral speech regulation simply because "
309. See supra notes 42-48 and notes 63-65 for a discussion of the broad interpretation of Arizona's first
Article XXVIII. See also supra notes 162-68 for a discussion of a discussion of a narrow construction's
applicability to Article XXX.
310. See supra notes 282-88 and accompanying text.
311. See Hull, 957 P.2d at 998; OKLA. CONST. art. XXX.
312. Hull, 957 P.2d at 998. See also Mills., 384 U.S. at 218.
313. See Hull, 957 P.2d at 1001.
314. See Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 170 P.3d 183, 209 (Alaska 2007). Because the
Alaska Supreme Court found the Alaska provision was an unconstitutional content-based restriction, the court
declined to consider whether the provision also constituted a prior restraint. Id. at 206 n.1 2 7. Due to the lack of
persuasive precedent regarding the issue, a court reviewing Article XXX may likewise follow suit, assuming
the court also classified the amendment as an unconstitutional content-based regulation. See supra note 130.
315. See generally United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); Hull, 957 P.2d at
997-98, 1001.
316. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
317. Id.
318. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). In order to pass intermediate
scrutiny, the measure must also be justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech and leave
open alternative methods of communication. However, assuming the reviewing court classifies Article XXX as
a content-neutral regulation, the court must have already found these elements. For a more detailed discussion
of why a finding of content-neutrality for Article XXX specifically requires that a reviewing court previously
found these elements, refer to supra notes 235-36 and 251-62 as well as accompanying text.
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'there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech.' "320
However, this does not permit a state to regulate substantially more speech than
necessary to achieve its interests. 32 1 In short, a speech restriction passes intermediate
scrutiny if "the "regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be
achieved less effectively absent the regulation."322
Absent Article XXX, Substantial Interests May Be Achieved Less Effectively
Article XXX would likely pass a constitutional review pursuant to intermediate
scrutiny. Even if a reviewing court did not find the State's purported justifications
compelling, the court would likely find significant interests in fiscal efficiency and
promoting English as a common language.323 Due to Article XXX's narrow
construction, the court may likewise find the amendment sufficiently narrowly tailored to
achieve those ends. 324 Article XXX regulates only official actions, perhaps reaching
only those actions necessary to avoid providing taxpayer-funded services in languages
other than English, a purpose of the amendment. 32 5 Thus, the amendment's narrow
scope arguably prevents Article XXX from regulating substantially more speech than
necessary to achieve its purpose. 326
The amendment also purports to promote English as a common language, a
purpose relatively unaffected by the narrow construction.327 Alaska and Arizona found
their respective official English measures not narrowly tailored to this purpose due to the
availability of other, less restrictive means.328 However, pursuant to intermediate
scrutiny, the availability of less restrictive means does not require a finding of
unconstitutionality.329 Thus, the imaginable alternatives available to promote English as
Oklahoma's common language do not automatically invalidate Article XXX. 3 30 In fact,
the alternative ends might provide support to a court ultimately finding the amendment
constitutional. 33 1 Due to the diversity of languages spoken in Oklahoma,332 the court
320. Ward, 491 U.S. at 797 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
321. Id. at 800 ("So long as the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the
government's interest, however, the regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the
government's interest could be adequately served by some less-speech restrictive alternative.").
322. Id. at 799 (quoting Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689).
323. See Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc. v. Kritz, 170 P.3d 183, 206-07 (Alaska 2007) (finding a
compelling state interest in strengthening the English language and increasing efficiency in government). See
also Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984, 990 (Ariz. 1998) (recognizing the importance of establishing a common
language, although not finding it to be a compelling state interest).
324. See supra notes 162-68 for discussion of the narrowing interpretation of Oklahoma's Article XXX. See
also Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
325. OKLA. CONST. art. XXX. See also Interview, supra note 258.
326. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 799-800.
327. Interview, supra note 258.
328. See generally Alaskans for a Common Language, Inc., 170 P.3d at 207-09; Hull, 957 P.2d at 996-1002.
329. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725-26 (2000). See also Ward, 491 U.S. at 798.
330. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798. For a discussion of possible alternative means to accomplish the State's
purposes, see supra notes 294-307 and accompanying text.
331. See generally Ward, 491 U.S. at 799-801; United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 688-89 (1985).
332. See Oklahoma Data Profile, Selected Social Characteristics, supra note 99. For a more detailed
discussion of the Oklahoma's demographics, please refer to supra notes 100-114 and accompanying text, as
well as the appendices to this Comment.
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could find that the Legislature concluded that alternative methods, like individual
legislation or appropriation, would achieve their purposes less effectively than Article
XXX due to their reactive, rather than proactive, nature. 333 The Supreme Court
consistently declines to substitute judicial judgment of proper methods for that of the
legislature in content-neutral restrictions, and a reviewing court would likely follow
suit.334
Thus, a reviewing court could conclude that Article XXX narrowly promotes a
substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
amendment. 33 5 If so, the reviewing court must find Article XXX constitutional as a
content-neutral restriction. 336
CONCLUSION
In November 2010, Oklahoma voters made the decision to adopt State Question
751 and amend the Oklahoma Constitution, a decision presumably informed by the
amendment's test in the crucible of state politics during the election cycle. 337 However,
Article XXX will likely face a more restrained and calculated test through the judicial
system.338 Article XXX's narrow application to "official actions" resolves many of the
problems of previous official English measures. Specifically, the limitation will likely
save Article XXX from invalidation pursuant to the overbreadth doctrine. However, that
same narrow construction lends strength to a vagueness challenge. Article XXX's
narrow scope may also influence a court's decision to classify the amendment as a
content-based or content-neutral restriction, a decision that will likely prove
determinative of Article XXX's constitutionality. Only time and judicial review will tell
if Oklahoma truly can "make it official."33 9
-Mariann M Atkins
333. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (quoting Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689).
334. See generally Ward, 491 U.S. at 800; Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299
(1984).
335. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (quoting Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689).
336. Id.
337. See Letter, supra notel 19.
338. See generally In re Initiative Petition No. 366, 46 P.3d 123 (Okla. 2002). See also Gentges v. Henry,
CV-2010-1324 (Tulsa Cnty. Dist. Ct. Nov. 16, 2010).
339. See generally OKLA. CONST. art. XXX.
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